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Abstract:  A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is emerging field in Information 
and communication technology.  In  WSN data transmission and data collection are 
unsecure  because  of  sensor  node Incompatibility.  So providing security  to  Sensor 
network is very important. The key based Mechanism is secure data collection and 
it’s mainly used to guarantee data confidentiality. Range pair wise key is largely used 
due to the necessary of data encryption and decryption between each pair range of 
communication node. Fixed key mechanism difficult  for the attacker  to detect  the 
regularity of the randomly generated key chain function in privacy homomorphism 
(PH).PH means no intermediate node to encrypt and decrypt only direct collect and 
aggregate  data for  encryption and decryption.  It  is  special  key based scheme.  It’s 
totally based on beta distribution and some statistical tool using key code method by 
using Complexity exchanging code key method addressing protocol. We show how to 
reduce significant attacks and secure data collection on wireless sensor network.
Keywords:  Wireless  Sensor  Network,  Privacy  Homomorphism  (PH),  Security,  
reliable protocol, beta distribution, statistical tool, key methods, key compression P-  
box.
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1 Introduction
A  wireless  sensor  network  (WSN)  is  a  wireless  network  consisting  of  spatially 
distributed autonomous devices that use sensors to monitor physical or environmental 
conditions. These autonomous devices, or nodes, combine with routers and a gateway 
to create a typical  WSN system. The distributed measurement nodes communicate 
wirelessly  to  a  central  gateway,  which  provides  a  connection  to  the  wired  world 
where  you  can  collect,  process,  analyze,  and  present  your  measurement  data.  To 
extend distance and reliability in a wireless sensor network, you can use routers to 
gain  an  additional  communication  link  between  end  nodes  and  the  gateway.  The 
resource limitations of WSNs, the data may be tampered easily during transmission. It 
may happen that data reach incorrect destinations or received incorrect data. It is an 
important issue for WSNs that base stations must receive correct data and ensure the 
data confidentiality. 
The inherent limitations of WSNs, eavesdropping or jamming may easily occur, and 
WSNs are often applied to abominable environments and conditions, such as military 
affairs and the fire emergencies. Therefore, security has become an important issue in 
the world of WSNs. The main functionalities of WSN are sensing data and send back 
to base station. Therefore, it is an important issue to make sure that data can reach the 
base station correctly and efficiently. Therefore, we need to pay special attention to 
security issues when data is being forwarded.  The data dissemination service is that 
each node transfers the received packets to another node until the packets, following 
the routes selected by the routing protocol, reach the destination. 
Therefore, it is very important to establish a secure routing path, a correct and reliable 
routing path to ensure that data can reach the correct destination and to maintain the 
confidentiality and integrity of the data packet. Main security threats in WSN are: 1) 
Radio links are insecure – eavesdropping / injecting faulty information is possible. 2) 
Sensor  nodes are  not  temper  resistant  –  if  it  is  compromised  attacker  obtains  all 
security information The various Attacker types in wireless sensor network are Mote-
class: attacker  has  access  to  some number  of  nodes  with  similar  characteristics  / 
laptop-class: attacker has access to more powerful devices. Outside / inside: attacker 
compromised some number of nodes in the network.
In WSN Key management protocol must establish a key between all sensor nodes that 
must exchange data securely and also it facilitates the node addition / deletion should 
be supported.  It  should work  in  undefined  deployment  environment;  unauthorized 
nodes should not be allowed to establish communication with network nodes.
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The  various  key  management  approaches  the  already  proposed  are  Pre-deployed 
keying: Straightforward  approaches,  Eschenauer  /  Gligor  random  key  pre-
deployment, Chan / Perrig q-composite approach, Zhu / Xu approach, DiPietro smart 
attacker model and PRK protocol; Key derivation information pre-deployment: Liu / 
Ning polynomial pre-deployment;  Self-enforcing autonomous approaches:  Pair-wise 
asymmetric (public key).
Key management  poses  a  main concern  for  security  operation  in  sensor  network. 
Many  key  management  protocols  are  proposed  homogeneous  sensor  network, 
however these networks have limited performance and security heterogeneous sensor 
network are proposed to  outcome these drawbacks.  In  this  method using wireless 
sensor network that consisted of three types of key method, that’s are Random key, 
deterministic key and Hybrid key.  Random key can randomly chooses several  key 
from  the  key  pool  and  to  create  chain.  Deterministic  key  can  use  dynamic 
computation to generate key that can enhance the connection between sensor nodes. 
Key  pre  distribution  is  the  method  of  distribution  of  key  on  to  nodes  before 
deployment. The nodes build up the network using secret key after deployment. When 
the reach their target position. Key predistribution schemes are various methods has 
been developed by academicians for a better maintenance of key management. A key 
predistribution  has  three  phases  key  distribution,  shared  key,  discovery,  path  key 
establishment
1.1    Security attacks on wireless sensor network:
The lists of attack faced by a wireless sensor network are: 
Node  outage,  Physical  attacks,  Message  corruption,  False  node,  Node  replication 
attacks,  Passive  information  gathering  Attacks  against  privacy,  Monitor  eves 
dropping,  Traffic  analysis,  Camoutflages,  Adversaries,  Denial  of  service,  Node 
subversion,  Node  malfunction,  Routing   attacks,  Selective   forwarding,  Sinkhole, 
Wormhole. 
1.2   Role of Key Management and Agreement Protocols
The various Key concepts are:
Key: Symmetric  key which is  used  to  secure communication   among  two   or 
more  sensor  nodes.
Keychain: List  of  keys  or  keying   materials   which  are  stored  on  a  sensor 
node.
Key pool: List  of  all keys  or  keying   materials   which  are  used  in  the   WSN.
Link key: This is used to secure communication   over   a   direct   wireless link.
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Path key: This is used to secure communication over multihop wireless link, through 
one or more   sensor node.
Pair wise:  It’s used secure unicast communication between   pair of sensor nodes.
Forward  secrecy: It  requires  that  a  departed/expelled  member  of  a  group  should 
ensure that the departed/expelled member cannot decrypt group data after it leaves the 
group.
Backward secrecy: It  requires  that  a  new member  should not  have  access  to  the 
previous (old) group key.  This ensures that  the newly joined node cannot decrypt 
messages that are exchanged in the group before the node joined the group access to 
future keys after it has left the group cannot decrypt group data after it leaves the 
group.
Rekeying:  Rekeying  refers  to the processing of changing the group key securely 
upon a membership change. Rekeying should be triggered by the protocol after each 
membership change to ensure forward and backward secrecy.
The Authentication key methods are: 
KDC - Key Distribution Centre 
HWSN - Hierarchical Key Chain WSN
MAC- Message authentication   node 
PRF-Pseudo Random   Function
ENC - Encryption.
DAG - Directed   Acyclic Graph.
The key management and key agreement protocols should cope with the demands of 
various applications. Besides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. 
2 Secure Data Collection
The key based Mechanism is secure data collection in mainly used to guarantee 
data confidentiality range pair wise key is largely used due to the necessary of data 
encryption and decryption between each pair range of communication node. Fixed 
key  mechanism difficult  for  the  attacker  to  detect  the  regularity  of  the  randomly 
generated  key  chain  function  in  Privacy  Homomorphism  (PH).PH  means  no 
intermediate node to encrypt and decrypt, only direct collect and aggregate data. It is 
special key based scheme.
It is totally based on beta distribution and some statistical using key code method we 
show how to reduce significant attacks and secure data collection on wireless sensor 
network.
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2.1   Data Exchange Protocol
Before the sensor are deployed in network (each sensor x is supplied with 
flowing item). N is the number of sensor thus  the total number of key that need to be 
in sensor  network (n+1)/2 sink node key SI.
Step1: Total number of sensor data allocated in the network xn
A=f(x1, x2, x3……….. xn)
Step2: Sink node only allocated tempravary key in all sensor   node.
x1=2 (Temp key(2))
x2=5 (Temp key(5))
.
.
.
xn = n (Temp key (n))
Step3: Where sink node SI to store the original key because sink node only maintained 
in secret key.
SI  x1= 6   (org  K(6))
Si  x1 = 7  (org K(7))
…
…
. Xn=12(org(12))
Step4: After get the original Information every sink node is to change the temp key and 
also original key.
SI: verify(x1, x2) 
2.2    Permutation boxes and compression box methods
P-Box 
Here we define the permutation boxes (P – Box) for mapping the possible keys, the 
straight P – Boxes have the npossible inputs and m possible outputs. Here for 
example 6 possible mapping of 3X3 P – Boxes. 
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Fig 1: P – Box key
Compression P-Box
Here we introduce the compression method for the above P – Box methods it’s called 
as Compression P – Box.  A Compression P – Box have an n   inputs and m   
outputs  in  after  the  compression  of  possible  keys.  Were  Compressed  P  – Box is 
defend against eavesdropping and also it’s cannot defend against impersonation. The 
diagrammatic prototype is described below:
Fig 2: A compressed P – Box key
Fig 3: Defend against eavesdropping
Fig 4: Can’t defend against impersonation
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2.3    Mutual authentication
In the mutual authentication the Sensor X authenticate sensor Y and Sensor 
Y authenticate  sensor  X.  Encrypt  and  later  decrypt  all  Exchange  data  message 
between X and Y.  The prototype of mutual authentication is represented below:
Fig 5: X authenticate Y
Fig 6: Y authenticate X
Here  X is  adjacent  Y  means  to  get  the  Y  information.  In  some  time  the  mutual 
authentication is adversary to other unknown node. Example the Z adjacent to X or Z 
adjacent to Y. Here Z copy the both information from X and Y. 
Note: (i). X adjacent Y (neighbored). (ii)Two sensor could be stationary. This model is 
described as below:
Fig 7: Here Z is the adversary Node in Mutual authentication.
3      Communication Device
Communication   device is used  to  exchange data between   individual node 
by transiver, single hop and multihop . This task is to  convert  a  bit  stream coming 
from  a  micro controller  and  convert  them  to  radio  waves
Transiver:
It’s convert    week  signal  to  change  strong  signal  amplifier.
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Fig 8: Transiver
Single hop:
Were single hop is power limitation and its limitation distance between sender and 
receiver. Its provide the direct communication between source and destination. Sink 
node is not always possible in single hop.
Multi hop:
In  the  multi  hop  direct  communication  is  impossible  because  of  distance  (or) 
Obstacles. 
3.1 Path loss attenuation 
Distance-dependent loss of power, called path loss. The received power at a distance 
of  d  ≥  d0 between  transmitter  and  receiver  is  described  by  the  Friis  free-space 
equation.
Where, Ptx is the transmission power, Gt and Gr are the antenna gains of 
transmitter and receiver. Where, d0 is the so-called far-field distance, λ is the 
wavelength and L ≥ 1 summarizes losses.
Where, γ is the path loss exponent called log distance.
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4 Address Assignment Algorithm
The   assignment  algorithm  must  take the   existence  of   asymmetric 
links  into  account   when  node  a  has  successfully   executed  the  assignment  
algorithm,   it  can  pick  an   own  address. Instead of pick a random address  a select  
lowest possible  non conflicting  address  .in a sense an  address  selection is greedy 
but  this approach  ,lower address  are preferred  and  occur more after  in the network 
lower  address   have  a   higher  relative     frequency   and  we  have   non uniform 
address   distribution.
Content based addressing: Several   content   based naming systems have appeared 
in the directed diffusion routing. The   attribute  type specifies the  kind  of  sensor  to 
which  the   interest   is  directed(temperature sensor).the  next  attribute  threshold 
from  below  specifies, where a   threshold   of   20c is  erosed  from below  square 
between    (0,0) and  (20,20).
Address   matching   algorithm:
Parameters: 
Attribute sets A and B
// A corresponds to the interest, B to the data message
For each attribute a in A 
where a.op is formal {
matched = false
foreach attribute b in B 
where a.key == b.key and b.op is actual 
{ if  b.val satisfies condition
expressed by a.key and a.val
 then {
matched = true
}
}
if (not matched ) 
then {
return false }
}
return true; // matching successful !
Example Simulation work for address matching algorithm:
temperature sensor
<type ,temperature ,IS >
<x-coordinate ,10,IS >
<y-coordinate ,10,IS >
interest message
type ,temperature ,EQ >
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<threshold -from -below ,20,IS >
<x-coordinate ,20,LE >
<x-coordinate ,0,GE >
<y-coordinate ,20,LE >
<y-coordinate ,0,GE >
<interval ,0.05 ,IS >
<duration ,10,IS >
<class ,interest ,IS >
Operator name:
EQ Matches if actual value is equal to value
NE Matches if actual value is not equal to value
LT  Matches if actual value is smaller than value
GT Matches if actual value is greater than value.
LE  Matches if actual value is smaller or equal to value
GE  Matches if actual value  is  larger  or  equal to value
5 Implementation of Key Method
Simple  key  distribution  controller   is  one  of  the  simplest  solution   for   key 
management    a  group  controller  C  shares  a  secret  key  keyC,i   with  each 
groupmember GMi . The groupcontroller is responsible for generating a group secret 
key kG,. To distribute the group key, C encrypts the group key with kC,i and unicasts 
it to Mi . When a new member MN+1 joins the group, the group controller generates a 
new group key k’G’.,encrypts it with the old group key kG, and multicasts it to {M1,  
M2, · · ·, Mn}. The  group  controller  encrypts  the  new  group  key  k’G’  using 
kC,N+1.
5.1 Key relationship Notations:
Triple(m,n,r) :where m is a finite and nonempty set of group members, n is 
a finite and nonempty set of keys, and R  ⊂ M × N is a binary member-key relation. 
Let assume keyset(Me ) ,user set(kn)
keyset(Me ) = {k|(Me, kn)  ∈ R} represents the set of all keys held by member M
keyset(φ)  =  φ.  user set(k)  = {Me  |(M, k)   ∈ R)}, represents  the set  of all  members 
holding key k.
5.2 Mathematical Implements:
A key graph where,
 keyset(M2) = {k12, k234, k1234}, keyset(M3) = {k23, k1234},
user set(k1) = {M1} and user set(k12) = {M1, M2}, where ki··· j
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The following actions are performed by the group controller:
C → {M1, · · ·, M6} : {k1−9}k1−8
C → {M7, M8} : {k1−9, k789}k78
C → M9 : {k1−9, k789}k9 .
The member-join, the group{M1, · · · M8}, changes to {M1, · · ·, M9} and subgroup 
{M7,  M8}  changes  to  {M7,  M8,  M9}.  M1,  ·  ·  ·  M6 belong  to  subgroups  whose 
compositions are not affected by the new member-join, and, they only receive the 
new  session  key  k1−9  encrypted  using  the  old  group  key  k1−8.  Whereas  the 
composition of the group containing M7 and M8 is affected by the new member-join.
When M9 leaves the group,  the group controller performs the following actions:
C → {M1, M2, M3} : {k1−8}k123
C → {M4, M5, M6} : {k1−8}k456
C → M7 : {k1−8, k78}k7
C → M8 : {k1−8, k78}k8 . 
When M9 leaves the group, M1, · · · M6 cannot use the old group session key kG = 
k1−9 to encrypt the new session key k_G= k1−8, because M9 knows theold key kG.
5.3   Modulated   signal
S(t)=A(t).cos(w(t)+φ(t))
Where,
A(t)=time  dependent   amplitude
W(t)=time  dependent   frequency
Φ(t)=phase  shift
S(t)=time   dependent  sensor node
SI(t)= ]
Where w0 is   the    centre   frequency    ,ф is   an   arbitrary   constant   initial 
phase .Ei(t)  is   constant   over   symbol  duration  (0,t). We   assume m different 
levels.
  Explicitly   symbol   energy E.
Binary   data   string   110100101 is modulated using  E0(t)=0,   E1(t)=1.  t-switching 
of   the  transmitter    is  called   ON-OFF  Keying(OOK).  
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6 Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  study  the  key  methodology  key  code  data  exchange 
protocol,  compression  P  –  Box,  Path  loss  attenuation,  and  address  assignment 
algorithm,  content  based  addressing  and  address  matching  algorithm,  time 
synchronization  modulation  signal,  mutual  authentication,  authentication  key 
mechanism for secure data collection in wireless sensor network.
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